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A NOTE ON COSTLY SEQUENTIAL SEARCH 







We modify the paper of Stahl (1989) on sequential consumer search in an oligopoly context 
by relaxing the assumption that consumers obtain the first price quotation for free. When all 
price quotations are costly to obtain, a new equilibrium arises where consumers randomize 
between not searching at all and searching for one price. The region of parameters for which 
this equilibrium exists becomes larger as the number of shoppers decreases and/or the number 
of firms increases. The comparative statics properties of this new equilibrium are interesting. 
In particular, the expected price increases as search cost decreases, and is constant in the 
number of shoppers and in the number of firms. We show that the Diamond result never 
obtains with truly costly search. 
JEL Code: C13, D40, D83, L13. 
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One of the most celebrated articles in the consumer search literature is the article by Stahl (1989).
Stahl (1989) studies a search model with two types of consumers and where ﬁrms price strategically.
Fully informed consumers (referred to as shoppers in his article) have no opportunity cost of time
and search for all prices at no cost; non-shoppers search sequentially, i.e., they ﬁrst observe one price
and then decide whether or not to observe a second price, and so on.1 Stahl (1989) assumes that
consumers observe the ﬁrst price quotation for free, as many other papers in the search literature,2
which implies that every buyer makes at least one search. In this paper, we study the implications
of relaxing this assumption.
The optimal sequential search rule implies that a consumer continues searching if, and only if,
the observed prices are above a certain reservation price. Knowing this, no ﬁrm will wish to charge
prices above the reservation price. Therefore, under the assumption that obtaining the ﬁrst price
observation is costless, buyers search exactly once in equilibrium and buy at the observed price. In
this note, we call this the full participation equilibrium. This equilibrium is one of the two possible
equilibrium conﬁgurations when the ﬁrst price quotation is not for free. The new equilibrium that
arises is one of partial participation, where some consumers decide not to search at all as they
rationally expect prices to be so high that they are indiﬀerent between searching and not searching.
The existence and characterization of this new equilibrium is one of the two main contributions of
this note.
The other main contribution is to provide a full comparative statics analysis of the eﬀects of
all the possible changes in the exogenous parameters. The main comparative statics eﬀects under
partial participation are as follows. A ﬁrst result is that when search costs decrease, expected
price increases. This result is mainly due to the fact that an increase in search cost implies more
participation of non-shoppers who search only once. As ﬁrms have monopoly power over these
consumers, they raise their prices. A second result is that an increase in the number of shoppers
does not have an eﬀect on expected price as their presence is exactly oﬀset by an increase in the
participation of non-shoppers. A last important result is that, unlike in Stahl’s model, expected
price does not tend to the monopoly price when the number of shoppers converges to zero, nor
1The implications of sequential consumer search are also examined in, e.g., Anderson and Renault (1999), Rein-
ganum (1979), Rob (1985), Stahl (1996) and Stigtlitz (1987).
2An important example in the non-sequential search literature using this assumption is Burdett and Judd (1983).
Janssen and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2004) is an exception. This paper studies the implications of entry in a model of
non-sequential search.
2when the number of ﬁrms increases without bound. This is due to the fact that when the fraction
of shoppers becomes very small, or when the number of ﬁrms increases beyond a critical value, the
economy turns into a partial participation equilibrium and in such an equilibrium expected price
is insensitive to changes in these parameters.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. A full characterization
and an overview of the two types of equilibria is given in Section 3. Section 4 presents the diﬀerent
comparative statics results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We examine the model of oligopolistic competition and sequential consumer search presented in
Stahl (1989), but we assume that all price quotations are costly to acquire for non-shoppers. The
features of the model are as follows. There are N ﬁrms that produce a homogeneous good at
constant returns to scale. Their identical unit cost can be normalized to zero and prices can be
interpreted as price-to-cost margins. There is a unit mass of buyers and we assume that buyers
hold inelastic demands.3 A consumer wishes to purchase at most a single unit of the good and
his/her valuation for the item is v > 0. A proportion ¹ 2 (0;1) of the consumers has negligible
opportunity cost of time and therefore searches for prices costlessly. These consumers are referred
to as shoppers. The other 1¡¹ percent of the buyers, referred to as non-shoppers, must pay search
cost c > 0 to observe every price quotation they get, including the ﬁrst one. The non-shoppers
search sequentially, i.e., a buyer ﬁrst decides whether to sample a ﬁrst ﬁrm or not and then, upon
observation of the price of the ﬁrst ﬁrm, decides to search for a second price or not, and so on. We
assume that v > c.
Firms and buyers play the following game. An individual ﬁrm chooses its price taking price
choices of the rivals as well as consumers’ search behavior as given. Likewise, an individual buyer
forms conjectures about the distribution of prices in the market and decides on his/her optimal
search strategy. We restrict the analysis to symmetric Nash equilibria. The distribution of prices
charged by a ﬁrm is denoted by F(p).
3Stahl (1989) considers a more general speciﬁcation of the demand function. The assumption of inelastic demand
allows us to compute explicitly the reservation price and give a full characterization of which equilibrium exists for
which conﬁgurations of parameters. The qualitative results do not depend on this assumption though.
33 Equilibria
We ﬁrst derive some auxiliary results.
Lemma 1 An equilibrium where non-shoppers do not search at all does not exist.
Proof. Suppose non-shoppers did not search. Then the only consumers left in the market
would be the shoppers. Therefore, competition between stores would drive prices down to marginal
cost. But then, as v ¡ c > 0, the non-shoppers would gain by deviating and searching once. ¥
Lemma 1 reveals that existence of equilibrium requires the non-shoppers to be active in the
market with strictly positive probability. The next result is provided by Stahl (1989).
Lemma 2 In equilibrium non-shoppers will not search beyond the ﬁrst ﬁrm.
Proof. See Lemma 2 of Stahl (1989). ¥
The idea behind Lemma 2 is that pricing above consumers’ reservation price is never optimal
for ﬁrms since buyers will continue searching; as a result, the price buyers will ﬁnd at the ﬁrst store
they encounter will always be accepted and no further search will take place.
Let us introduce the following notation. Let µ1 be the probability with which a non-shopper
searches for a price quotation. Lemmas 1 and 2 together imply that only two candidates for
equilibrium exist: either (a) µ1 = 1, or (b) 0 < µ1 < 1. The ﬁrst case is analyzed in Stahl
(1989). We shall refer to this equilibrium as an equilibrium with full consumer participation. This
is because if all consumers sample one ﬁrm they will all buy. This contrasts with case (b) where
consumers mix between not searching at all and searching once so not all consumers will conduct
a transaction. Let µ0 denote the probability with which a non-shopper does not search; then an
equilibrium with partial consumer participation is characterized by µ0 + µ1 = 1, 0 < µ1 < 1.
The next remark is that, since µ1 > 0 in any equilibrium, the equilibrium price distribution
must be atomless:
Lemma 3 Irrespective of the search behavior of non-shoppers, if F(p) is an equilibrium price dis-
tribution, then it is atomless. Hence, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. See Lemma 1 of Stahl (1989). The proof extends straightforwardly to the case of partial
consumer participation. ¥
4We note that ﬁrms have an incentive to charge low prices in order to attract all the shoppers
but at the same time they also have an incentive to charge high prices to extract income from the
consumers who do not compare prices. These two forces are balanced when ﬁrms randomize their
prices. Lemma 3 shows that equilibria must necessarily exhibit price dispersion, and that ﬁrm
pricing is always characterized by atomless price distributions. In what follows we shall examine
the characterization and the existence of the diﬀerent equilibria.
Case a: Equilibrium with full consumer participation (Stahl, 1989)
Assume that non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1, i.e., µ1 = 1. This is the case
analyzed by Stahl (1989) with two modiﬁcations. First, as Stahl considers a more general demand
structure, an explicit expression for the reservation price cannot be obtained. Second, as Stahl
(1989) assumes the ﬁrst price quotation to be for free, this full participation equilibrium exists for
all values of the parameters in his model, but not in ours. We will explicitly deﬁne the parameter
space for which the full participation equilibrium exists in our case. These two modiﬁcations deserve
a slightly extended analysis.
Under full participation, the expected payoﬀ to ﬁrm i from charging price pi when its rivals





+ ¹(1 ¡ F(pi))N¡1
¸
: (1)
This proﬁt expression follows from noting that expected demand faced by a ﬁrm stems from the
two diﬀerent groups of consumers. Firm i attracts the ¹ shoppers when it charges a price that is
lower than its rivals’ prices, which happens with probability (1 ¡ F(pi))N¡1. The ﬁrm also serves
the 1 ¡ ¹ non-shoppers whenever they they visit its store, which occurs with probability 1=N.
In equilibrium, a ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between charging any price in the support of F(¢).
Let us denote the upper bound of F(¢) by ¯ p. Any price in the support of F(¢) must then satisfy





+ ¹(1 ¡ F(pi))N¡1
¸
=
(1 ¡ ¹)¯ p
N
: (2)
Solving this equation for the price distribution yields
F(p) = 1 ¡
µ





5Since F is a distribution function there must be some p for which F(p) = 0. Solving for p one
obtains the lower bound of the price distribution p = (1 ¡ ¹)¯ p=(¹N + (1 ¡ ¹)).
The price distribution (3) represents optimal ﬁrm pricing. We now turn to discuss optimal
consumer behavior. Consider a buyer who has observed a given price p. This consumer will
continue searching if the expected beneﬁts from continued search exceed the search costs. We can
deﬁne the reservation price ½ as the price that makes a consumer indiﬀerent between searching once
more and accepting the price at hand; this price satisﬁes:
Z ½
p
(½ ¡ p)f(p)dp = c: (4)
No ﬁrm will charge a price above ½ since this will lead to continued search (Stahl, 1989). As a
result the upper bound ¯ p = ½. We now derive an expression for ½. Integrating by parts in (4) gives
½ ¡ E[p] ¡ c = 0: (5)
To calculate E[p] we solve equation (3) for p, which gives
p =
½
1 + bN(1 ¡ F)N¡1; (6)
where b = ¹=(1 ¡ ¹) > 0. We note now that E[p] = ½ ¡
R ½
p F(p)dp. By changing variables we can
write E[p] =
R 1





1 + bNyN¡1: (7)









We note that the reservation price ½ increases in c and in N, decreases in ¹ and is insensitive to v.
It must be the case that ½ · v. In addition, non-shoppers must ﬁnd it proﬁtable to search once,
rather than not searching at all, i.e,
v ¡ E[p] ¡ c > 0: (9)









This equation gives the set of parameters for which an equilibrium where buyers search once for
sure exists. For future reference, let us denote the left-hand-side of equation (10) as Φ(1;¹;N).4
We note that 0 < Φ(1;¹;N) < 1 for all values of the parameters.
Proposition 1 Let 0 < c
v · Φ(1;¹;N). Then a search equilibrium with full consumer participation
exists where buyers search for one price and ﬁrms charge prices from the set [(1¡¹)½=(¹N +(1¡
¹));½] according to the price distribution (3) where p = ½ and ½ solves equation (8).
From (5) and (9) and the continuity of the expression of the expected price, it follows that
the reservation price ½ converges to v when c=v approaches Φ(1;¹;N). The question then arises
what happens when search costs are high, in particular when c
v > Φ(1;¹;N)? In what follows we
show that an equilibrium with partial consumer participation arises. This equilibrium is new in
the sequential search literature and its properties are interesting.
Case b: Equilibrium with partial consumer participation
Now assume that non-shoppers randomize between searching for one price quotation and not search-





+ ¹(1 ¡ F(pi))N¡1
¸
: (11)
The economic interpretation of equation (11) is analogous to that of equation (1), except that there
are now (1 ¡ ¹)µ1 non-shoppers active, rather than 1 ¡ ¹. A similar analysis as above yields the
following equilibrium price distribution:
F(p) = 1 ¡
µ





with support [p; ¯ p] where p = (1¡¹)µ1¯ p=(¹N +(1¡¹)µ1). We now notice that the upper bound is
no longer equal to ½, but equal to v. To see this, note that non-shoppers should now be indiﬀerent
4The number 1 in the arguments of Φ(¢) stands for µ1=1.
7between searching for one price and not searching all, i.e., it must be the case that
v ¡ E[p] ¡ c = 0 (13)
It is obvious that conditions (5) and (13) can only hold together if ¯ p = v.
It remains to check that the distribution function speciﬁed in equation (12) with support [p;v]
is consistent with optimal search behavior of the non-shoppers. As mentioned above, it must be the
case that non-shoppers are indiﬀerent between searching and not searching, i.e., v ¡ E[p] ¡ c = 0.










For future reference, denote the left-hand-side of equation (14) as Φ(µ1;¹;N). Inspection of this
function reveals that Φ(0;¹;N) = 1 and that Φ(µ1;¹;N) is monotonically decreasing in µ1 and
increasing in ¹. It can also be shown that Φ(µ1;¹;N) decreases in N.5 Then:
Proposition 2 Let Φ(1;¹;N) < c
v < 1. Then a search equilibrium with partial consumer partici-
pation exists where ﬁrms set prices from the set [(1 ¡ ¹)µ1v=(¹N + (1 ¡ ¹)µ1);v] according to the
price distribution (12) and consumers randomize between searching for one price with a probabil-
ity µ1 which solves equation (14) and with the remaining probability they stay out of the market
altogether.
Overview of equilibria
Two equilibria may arise: either consumers search for one price with probability 1, or they mix
between searching and not searching. Inspection of the equations above immediately reveals that
whether consumers search more or less in equilibrium depends on three critical model parameters:
(i) the value of the purchase compared to the search cost c=v, (ii) the number of consumers with
negligible opportunity cost of time ¹, and (iii) the number of ﬁrms N. The regions of parameters
for which these equilibria exist are represented in Figure 1 (in these graphs we set N = 2). The
left graph exhibits a market with many shoppers while the right one illustrates a market with just
a few of them. The decreasing curve represents Φ(µ1;¹;N) as a function of µ1.
5The proof of this statement is omitted to save space.
8(a) ¹ = 0:8 (b) ¹ = 0:1
Figure 1: Equilibrium conditions sequential search (N = 2)
When there are many shoppers (Figure 1(a)), for large search cost parameters, say c1, non-
shoppers participate in the market only with probability less than one. This probability is given by
the point at which Φ(¢) and c1=v, intersect. It can be seen that as search cost falls relative to the
value of the purchase, these consumers ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to search more intensively. When search
cost is low enough, e.g. c2, non-shoppers search for one price with probability one.
The region of parameters for which an equilibrium with partial consumer participation exists is
sensitive to the parameters ¹ and N. As mentioned above the function Φ(¢) falls as ¹ decreases or N
increases (see equation (14)). Moreover, when ¹ approaches 0 or N becomes very large, Φ(µ1;¹;N)
approaches 0 for all values of µ1. Figure 1(b) illustrates a market where ¹ = 0:1. The ﬁgure reveals
that the existence region of a partial participation equilibrium covers almost the entire parameter
space. The same happens when the number of ﬁrms grows large. This indicates that the partial
participation equilibrium is relevant when the number of ﬁrms in the market is large and there are
few shoppers.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section we study the inﬂuence of changes in the parameters of the model on the average price
charged in the market. The results are summarized in Table 1. The results for the Stahl (1989)
case are known; the others are new. An upwards (downwards) arrow means that the variable under
consideration increases (falls); the symbol ‘¡’ means that the variable remains constant. In what
follows, our discussion shall concentrate on the most striking and interesting observations of the
9equilibrium with partial participation.
Partial consumer Full consumer parti-
participation cipation (Stahl, 1989)
µ1 E[p] ½ E[p]
# c " " # #
" ¹ " ¡ # #
" v " " ¡ ¡
" N # ¡ " "
Table 1: Summary of comparative statics results
a. The eﬀects of a reduction in search cost c
The ﬁrst result we want to emphasize is that a reduction in search cost leads to an increase in the
expected price in an equilibrium with partial consumer participation. This follows immediately
from the equilibrium condition v ¡ E[p] ¡ c = 0. To understand the intuition behind this result
let us point out that, as Figure 1 shows, the intensity with which non-shoppers search in this type
of equilibrium rises as c falls. Note further that these consumers are precisely those who do not
exercise price comparisons, and thus they are prepared to accept higher prices. Consequently, a
fall in c increases sellers’ incentives to charge higher prices more frequently, which in turn raises
the expected price.
When c decreases more, the equilibrium will change into one of full participation. Under full
participation, a decline in c results in a fall in the reservation price ½ (cf., Stahl (1989)). Inspection
of the equilibrium price distribution reveals that F increases as ½ decreases (see Proposition 1). As
a result, expected price decreases in c.
These observations regarding the inﬂuence of a reduction in search cost on expected price-to-
cost margins are gathered in Figure 2. In Figure 2(a) we have simulated an economy where the
number of informed consumers is large (¹ = 0:8). This graph depicts expected price as a function
of relative search cost and illustrates the comparative statics analysis given above. When there
are few shoppers (¹ = 0:1) expected price decreases in search cost for almost the entire parameter
region (cf., Figure 2(b)). This is because for this parameter constellation the economy is most likely
to be in an equilibrium with partial consumer participation.
b. The eﬀects of an increase in the proportion of shoppers ¹
We next consider the eﬀects of an increase in ¹. Under partial participation, a change in the number
of shoppers does not inﬂuence expected price-to-cost margins as nothing changes to the equilibrium
10(a) ¹ = 0:8 (b) ¹ = 0:1
Figure 2: The inﬂuence of lower search cost c on expected price (N = 2)
condition v ¡ E[p] ¡ c = 0. To understand the underlying economic forces of this result, we ﬁrst
note that an increase in ¹ has in principle a pro-competitive eﬀect. Keeping the search intensity
of non-shoppers constant, ﬁrms would tend to charge lower prices with higher probability as there
are relatively more shoppers. However, a change in ¹ also aﬀects µ1. To see this, one can apply the


































which means that an increase in ¹ results in an increase in the search intensity of the non-shoppers
µ1. This is obviously due to the fact that more informed consumers in the market makes searching
more attractive for the non-shoppers, as the former buyers put pressure on ﬁrms to reduce prices.
A higher search intensity of non-shoppers in turn gives ﬁrms incentives to increase prices, since
non-shoppers do not compare prices. Interestingly, these two opposite forces oﬀset each other so
that expected price remains constant.
If non-shoppers search for one price for sure, the pro-competitive eﬀects of an increase in ¹
mentioned above are strengthened by the fact that the reservation price ½ decreases in ¹ and thus
expected prices fall (cf., Stahl (1989)). These remarks are gathered and illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3(a) simulates an economy where product’s valuation is relatively low compared to search
cost (c=v = 0:5). The ﬁgure depicts expected price-to-cost margins as a function of ¹. As Φ(1;¹;N)
is decreasing in ¹, it easily follows that for a given N and c=v, there is a unique b ¹ such that inequality
11(a) c=v = 0:5 (b) c=v = 0:05
Figure 3: The inﬂuence of ¹ on expected price (N = 2).
(10) holds with equality. Therefore, the market equilibrium exhibits partial participation when ¹
lies in the interval (0; b ¹) and it exhibits full participation when ¹ lies in the interval (b ¹;1). It
is straightforward to see that, starting from an equilibrium with full consumer participation, as
¹ ! 0 the economy eventually moves into an equilibrium with only partial participation so the
Diamond result cannot arise in our model. In Figure 3(b) we have simulated an economy where
search cost is relatively low (c=v = 0:05). The only diﬀerence is that the region of parameters for
which consumers search for one price with probability 1 is much larger than before.
c. The eﬀects of an increase in the value of the purchase v
We next brieﬂy focus on changes in v. For convenience we shall graph expected price against c=v.
The main diﬀerence with the (reverse) eﬀects of a change in c, is that under full participation c
aﬀects ½, whereas v does not aﬀect ½. So, the only diﬀerence with case a. is that now when buyers
search for one price for sure, an increase in v does not alter the reservation price of the non-shoppers
½ so expected margins remain unchanged.
The graphs of Figure 4 show the inﬂuence of an increase in v on expected prices. Figure 4(a)
simulates an economy where search costs and the number of informed consumers are relatively high
(c = 0:5 and ¹ = 0:8). When c=v lies in the interval (Φ(1);1), non-shoppers do not participate
in the market surely. In this parameter area, the expected margin rises as v increases. When c=v
is between 0 and Φ(1), non-shoppers search for one price with probability 1. For this region of
parameters expected margins are unaﬀected by a change in v. Figure 4(b) shows the case of an
economy with relatively few shoppers.
12(a) c = 0:5 and ¹ = 0:8 (b) c = 0:05 and ¹ = 0:1
Figure 4: The impact of v on expected price (N = 2)
d. The eﬀects of an increase in the number of ﬁrms N
Under partial participation, it immediately follows from the equilibrium condition v ¡E[p]¡c = 0
that an increase in N does not aﬀect expected price. The underlying economic forces that bring
about this result are, however, less straightforward. We have noted before that Φ(µ1;¹;N) is
decreasing in N. This means that without a change in µ1 expected prices would rise: as N increases
it becomes more and more unlikely that an individual ﬁrm sells to the shoppers and each ﬁrm tends
to concentrate more and more on selling to the non-shoppers. Therefore, expected price would rise
for a given µ1. Higher expected prices means, however, that a larger fraction of non-shoppers prefers
not to buy and this eﬀect exactly oﬀsets the ﬁrst eﬀect.
The analysis for the case of full participation follows Stahl (1989) and he shows that expected
prices rise in N. Intuitively, only the ﬁrst eﬀect discussed above is relevant here as µ1 is ﬁxed to be
equal to 1. In the limit, Stahl (1989) shows that expected price converges to the monopoly price
and the Diamond result holds.
It is then interesting to see which equilibrium arises for which values of N. We will argue that
for given c=v and ¹ when N becomes suﬃciently large, the equilibrium is characterized by partial
participation. What happens as N increases is that, if the non-shoppers keep searching for one
price with probability one, expected price tend to the monopoly price and eventually, the condition
v ¡ E[p] ¡ c > 0 is violated. This is easily seen upon inspection of (10) and noting that Φ(1;¹;N)
declines monotonically with N and converges to zero as N approaches inﬁnity. The implication
of this is that starting from an equilibrium with full participation our model does not yield the
13Diamond result in the limit since at some point the economy turns to a partial participation
equilibrium. Figure 5 below illustrates the comparative statics results discussed above.
(a) c = 0:5 and ¹ = 0:8 (b) c = 0:05 and ¹ = 0:1
Figure 5: The impact of N on expected price
5 Conclusion
In this note, we have taken the seminal model of Stahl (1989) on sequential consumer search and
oligopolistic pricing and studied the implications of relaxing the assumption that consumers obtain
the ﬁrst price quotation for free. When also the ﬁrst price quotation is obtained at a positive
search cost, a new type of equilibrium arises where consumers randomize between not searching
and searching for one price, i.e., where there is less than full consumer participation. The partial
participation equilibrium exists when search costs are above a certain threshold (depending on the
other parameter values). This threshold can be made arbitrarily low provided that the number of
ﬁrms is large enough and/or the number of shoppers is suﬃciently small. Therefore, especially in
markets with many ﬁrms and/or with few shoppers, this partial participation equilibrium should
be seriously considered. This new equilibrium exhibits interesting comparative statics properties.
In particular, the expected price increases as search cost decreases, and is constant in the number
of shoppers and in the number of ﬁrms. Finally, the paper shows that, starting from an equilibrium
with full participation, a Diamond result never obtains when the number of shoppers goes to zero
and/or the number of ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity because with truly costly search the economy eventually
moves to an equilibrium with partial consumer participation.
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